How KERI + AI Frameworks Will Transform Security
The Problem with AI Security Today
- AI agents act on behalf of users but lack verifiable identity
- API keys and tokens are static, stealable, and overprivileged
- No audit trail of what AI actually did vs. what it was authorized to do
- Revocation is slow, incomplete, or impossible
- AI actions are repudiable — “the AI did it” with no proof
Traditional Threat Landscape
Identity Threats
- Credential theft
- Session hijacking
- Impersonation attacks
- Privilege escalation
Authorization Threats
- Over-permissioned access
- Lateral movement
- Scope creep
- Stale permissions
Audit Threats
- Log tampering
- Missing evidence
- Deniability
- Incomplete trails
AI-Specific Threats
- Prompt injection
- Agent hijacking
- Unauthorized tool use
- Scope violation
How KERI Changes the Game
Cryptographic Identity for AI Agents
Every AI agent gets a delegated AID (Autonomic Identifier):
- Derived from the principal’s identity
- Explicitly scoped authority
- Instantly revocable
- Non-transferable
Threat eliminated: Credential theft becomes useless — keys are bound to the delegation chain.
Non-Repudiable Actions
Every action the AI takes is signed:
- Verifiable by anyone
- Attributable to specific agent
- Traceable to delegating principal
- Timestamped and sequenced
Threat eliminated: “The AI did it” now has cryptographic proof of exactly what, when, and under whose authority.
Scoped Delegation
Delegation credentials define exactly what the AI can do:
- Action types (read, write, sign, transfer)
- Value limits (max $1000 per transaction)
- Time bounds (expires in 24 hours)
- Counterparty restrictions (only interact with verified parties)
Threat eliminated: Over-permissioned access — AI literally cannot exceed its scope.
Instant Revocation
Revocation is cryptographically enforced:
- Immediate effect (no propagation delay)
- Verifiable by any relying party
- No central authority needed
- Audit trail of revocation itself
Threat eliminated: Stale permissions — revoked agents are immediately rejected everywhere.
Tamper-Evident Audit
Every interaction creates verifiable evidence:
- Key Event Logs (KEL) are append-only
- Witness receipts provide independent verification
- Duplicity detection catches inconsistencies
- Reconstruction possible without special access
Threat eliminated: Log tampering — evidence is cryptographically protected.
The KERI + AI Security Model
Before: Traditional AI Agent Security
User → API Key → AI Agent → Services
↓
(stealable, static, overprivileged)
Vulnerabilities:
- Key theft = full access
- No scope enforcement
- Actions are repudiable
- Revocation is incomplete
After: KERI-Delegated AI Agent
User (AID) → Delegation Credential → AI Agent (Delegated AID) → Services
↓
(scoped, revocable, auditable, non-repudiable)
Security properties:
- Delegation chain is verifiable
- Scope is cryptographically enforced
- Every action is signed
- Revocation is instant and complete
Threats Reduced or Eliminated
| Threat | Traditional | With KERI |
|---|---|---|
| Credential theft | High risk | Eliminated (keys bound to delegation) |
| Session hijacking | High risk | Eliminated (no sessions, per-action signing) |
| Impersonation | High risk | Eliminated (cryptographic identity) |
| Privilege escalation | Medium risk | Eliminated (scope enforced cryptographically) |
| Over-permissioned access | High risk | Eliminated (explicit delegation scopes) |
| Lateral movement | High risk | Severely reduced (scoped to specific actions) |
| Stale permissions | High risk | Eliminated (instant revocation) |
| Log tampering | Medium risk | Eliminated (tamper-evident logs) |
| Deniability | High risk | Eliminated (non-repudiable signatures) |
| Prompt injection | High risk | Reduced (actions still scoped) |
| Agent hijacking | High risk | Reduced (compromised agent still scoped) |
| Unauthorized tool use | Medium risk | Eliminated (delegation defines allowed tools) |
Practical Implementation
AI Agent Onboarding
- Principal creates delegation — Defines scope, duration, constraints
- Agent receives delegated AID — Cryptographically derived from principal
- Agent begins operating — Signs all actions with delegated key
- Services verify delegation — Check scope before allowing action
Runtime Security
- Every request is signed — Agent’s delegated AID signs each action
- Services verify scope — Is this action within delegation bounds?
- Witnesses receipt actions — Independent verification
- Logs are append-only — Tamper-evident audit trail
Incident Response
- Revoke delegation — Instant, cryptographic, universal
- Audit actions — Complete, verifiable history
- Attribute responsibility — Clear chain from action to principal
- Prove scope violation — If agent exceeded authority, evidence exists
Why This Matters
For Organizations
- Reduced liability — Clear attribution of AI actions
- Compliance ready — Audit trails that satisfy regulators
- Incident response — Know exactly what happened
- Granular control — AI does only what you authorize
For Users
- Trust with verification — Don’t trust AI, verify its actions
- Instant revocation — Change your mind, revoke immediately
- Privacy preserved — Selective disclosure of what AI can access
- Accountability — AI actions are your actions (verifiably)
For AI Developers
- Security by design — Not bolted on, built in
- Reduced attack surface — Scoped access limits damage
- Verifiable behavior — Prove your AI did what it claimed
- Interoperability — Standard delegation works across ecosystems
The Future: AI That Can Legally Act
KERI + AI frameworks enable something new: AI that can legally and cryptographically act, not just suggest.
- Sign contracts (within delegated authority)
- Make payments (within limits)
- Access services (with verifiable credentials)
- Represent users (with explicit, revocable delegation)
All while maintaining:
- Accountability — Every action attributable
- Auditability — Complete, tamper-evident history
- Revocability — Instant, universal, cryptographic
- Scoping — AI does exactly what authorized, nothing more
Conclusion
The combination of KERI’s cryptographic accountability with AI agent frameworks doesn’t just improve security — it fundamentally changes the threat model. Most traditional attacks become irrelevant when:
- Identity is cryptographic, not credential-based
- Authorization is scoped and enforced, not assumed
- Actions are signed and non-repudiable, not logged and forgettable
- Revocation is instant and universal, not slow and incomplete
This isn’t incremental improvement. It’s a paradigm shift in how we think about AI security.
TODO: Add diagrams, code examples, and real-world scenarios
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